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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
This deliverable provides recommendations on the appropriate degree of differentiation for 
infrastructure charges in the road passenger sector.  This deliverable addresses charges on urban and 
inter-urban roads and draws on material presented in more detail in other deliverables - notably in 
Deliverables 9.1, 8.3/9.2, 4.1 and 4.2.  
 
The deliverable addresses different types of differentiation (by time of day, type of vehicle, type of 
road, level of congestion and type of user) together and in combination. 
 
The recommendations contained herein are based primarily on work conducted within Workpackage 9 
and are thus based on: 
 the theoretical justification for differentiated road pricing; 
 evidence from world-wide experience with differentiated tolls (including evidence on practical 
issues, driver responses and system performance); and   
 results from transport model tests of the impacts of differentiated tolls (including a review of 
modelling conducted in other studies and new modelling conducted within the DIFFERENT 
project).  
 
In discussing the theoretical justification for differentiated road pricing the deliverable rehearses the 
arguments about economic efficiency and marginal cost pricing and goes on to consider the 
dimensions of behavioural response and the justification for dynamic differentiation in time and space, 
across time, across space, by type of vehicle, by type of road and by class of user. 
 
The practical constraints on differentiation of road charges are examined and it is concluded that the 
main constraints are likely to be financial, behavioural and political rather than technical.  It is noted 
that, although current and near-term technologies will support highly differentiated pricing regimes, the 
cost of introducing and running such systems may not be justified.  It is noted that a serious problem 
with highly differentiated charge regimes is likely to be the inability, or unwillingness, of individual 
travellers to predict the implications that the price structure would have for different journey options 
and the consequential likelihood that the subtleties of the price signal will be lost.  It is also noted that 
a highly differentiated charge structure might be difficult to defend politically. 
 
Results from existing schemes – most notably those in Trondheim (the toll ring), Singapore (the ERP 
scheme), France (the variable motorway charges), the US (the HOT lanes), London (the Congestion 
Charge), Stockholm (the Congestion Tax) and Milan (the Ecopass scheme) - is examined for evidence 
of the effectiveness of differentiated charging.  The implications of other evidence – e.g. from the 
differentiated vehicle taxes in Germany and the UK, from the results of questionnaires and 
experiments, and from modelling work in Italy and the UK  – is also considered.  
 
In the light of the evidence, it is concluded that the following principles should apply irrespective of the 
underlying reason for introducing differentiated road charges:  
 When designing a differentiation scheme, account must be taken of the full range of potential 
effects in both the short term and the long term.  (For example, although introduction of higher 
motorway tolls for the most polluting vehicles may, in the long term, result in decreased use of 
such vehicles, the main short term effect may be for such vehicles to divert to un-tolled roads – 
where they may create even more nuisance); 
 Where responsibility for setting charges in a network is split between different authorities or 
concessionaires but there is a potential interaction between the sub networks; 
• it is important to consider the nature of potential interactions between co-introduced 
sets of charges in different parts of the network.  
• cooperation on technical and procedural issues, and over detailed definitional points such 
as common time zones for peak-load pricing, vehicle classifications and exemptions, is 
desirable even if the two road authorities have different objectives (in the absence of such co-
operation the resulting complexity will increase costs for system operators and end users and 
cause particular resentment among the latter). 
 Recommendations for Differentiated Charges for Car Drivers 
 
26/05/08              Deliverable 9.3          Page v 
 In order to achieve public acceptance of differentiated charges, it is important to explain the 
reason for the differentiation (e.g. to achieve reductions in congestion where and when it is 
most severe, to discourage use of environmentally damaging vehicles, to protect vulnerable 
groups of drivers, etc). 
 Finally, even every effort has been made to help people understand the charge structure (see 
section 6.2), it would be unwise to expect a precise response to complex pricing signals. 
Results show that precise calculation of prices by individual travellers is unlikely and that people 
are likely to base their response on a heuristic assessment  - particularly if the differences 
between the price levels are low because people will not think it worth the effort to calculate the 
precise value.  As a generalisation, one should expect under-response to complex prices in high-
price domains and over-response to prices in low price domains (unless the expected price is so 
low that it is ignored completely).  
 
It should also be recognised that people differ in terms of their ability to respond to complex pricing 
signals and that this may give rise to equity concerns.  People’s ability to respond to complex pricing 
signals will depend on their prior experience and their access to computer-based support systems.  
 
Where the objective of introducing differentiated charges is to influence road users to change their 
behaviour in line with the price signal, the following guiding principles should be born in mind:  
 Do not introduce unnecessary differentiation.  The more complex pricing schemes are, the 
more difficulties people will have in dealing with them and the less likely they are to respond to the 
nuances embodied in the charges.  
 Build gradually on existing differentiation.  People become familiar with particular types of 
differentiation and so find it easier to deal with differentiations with which they are already familiar.  
Also, during the introduction phase of road pricing, low levels of differentiation (or even 
undifferentiated prices) are recommended to ensure better understanding and habituation to the 
new situation.  When road users have become familiar with the initial charges an increased level 
of differentiation can be introduced. 
 Avoid types of differentiation which are particularly difficult for people to comprehend.  For 
example, avoid elements which:  
• vary non-linearly (e.g. with price as an increasing function of speed),  
• vary unpredictably (e.g. with price as a function of current congestion),  
• are not clearly observable (e.g. with price based on current emissions),  
• are based on values which are not readily known (e.g. with prices expressed per km – because 
people do not have good knowledge of journey distances),  
• are based on spatial divisions which may not be widely known (e.g. with cordons or zone 
boundaries which do not follow well-known boundaries), and 
• imply complex cross-linking to other elements (e.g. with different time bands applying in 
different zones - people have difficulties dealing with interacting variables). 
 Provide information and advice about the price structure of the charging schemes.   This is 
to help users see/understand the underlying “pattern” and thus make the details easier to recall 
(especially important in the case of highly differentiated prices).  
 Provide information which stresses the justification for the scheme. (e.g. information on 
benefits, use of revenue, protection for vulnerable groups, scientific justification, political support).  
This is to make the scheme seem more acceptable to users and so increasing their understanding 
and willingness to engage. 
 Provide (and publicise) opportunities to change behaviour according to the differentiated 
charging schemes.  Perceived opportunities for users to respond to pricing schemes (rather than 
simply having to pay the charge) are essential to avoid negative reactance and failure to engage.  
 
Although it has not been proven by detailed modelling, it appears unlikely that a scheme designed to 
maintain free-flow on the motorways or maximise revenue for the motorway manager would 
simultaneously minimise congestion and other externalities within the urban area.  Thus, at risk of 
stating the obvious, in order to maximise overall benefits, a degree of prioritisation or compromise is 
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required between potentially conflicting objectives of different stakeholders.  In doing so, the following 
principles should be born in mind: 
 The “best” solution would allow charges to be differentiated according to the 
characteristics of individual links and the amount of traffic wanting to use them at any 
given point in time.  This implies a degree of differentiation which, while technically achievable, 
may be more complex than people can cope with. 
 As a second best approach, the different roles and characteristics of different types of road may 
make it wholly appropriate to introduce different charges on different types of road – with 
higher charges on congested urban roads than on parallel motorways. 
 Equally, a considerable proportion of the theoretically achievable benefit can be obtained by 
introducing time-varying tolls.   Considerable benefit can be gained simply with a peak / off-peak 
differentiation but greater benefit is achievable (in the case of limited access links at least) from a 
dynamic variation as applied in some of the US HOT lanes.  
 
Generally it seems likely that overall benefits (defined as minimisation of delay, accidents and other 
externalities while maximising the benefits to society and the economy) might be maximised by 
combining a charge on the urban roads with charges designed to give a degree of protection to traffic 
using motorways and other strategic links.  The urban charge might be levied on traffic crossing 
specified cordons or using roads within a specified area while the strategic-link-protection charge 
might involve specific charges for using motorway access or egress links or dynamic charges just 
sufficient to preserve free flow conditions.  
 
Where the objective is simply to maximise revenues then differentiation takes on a new role.  
Generally speaking, it becomes a mechanism for yield management and for targeting special markets. 
For example: 
 By charging higher tolls in exchange for a guaranteed high level of service (as in the US 
HOT lanes).  
 By charging higher tolls to traffic which has little choice but to pay (as may be the case for 
some bridge tolls, but is generally truer for peak period traffic than for off-peak traffic). 
 By offering discounts to users who may be encouraged to increase their usage of the 
system (as in the the Liber-t Week-End and Activ-t  schemes). 
 
It is also noted that, if the objective is to maximise revenues, advantage can be taken of the fact that, 
faced with a seemingly complex charge in a high, or very low, price domain, users tend to under-
respond to the actual charge (i.e. they have a tendency simply to pay up and continue with their 
previous pattern of behaviour) – thus yielding more revenue than would have been produced if the 
charge had been readily understood. 
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1 INTRODUCTION   
1.1 BACKGROUND  
There is considerable interest in the introduction of differentiated road infrastructure charges.  Some 
examples already exist and several proposals are under consideration. 
 
Although most of the implemented road user charging regimes are quite simple, the dimensions of 
differentiation that have been adopted or considered include: 
 time of day and/or day of week, 
 location, 
 type of road,  
 current degree of congestion, 
 type of vehicle,  
 frequency of use,  and 
 category of road user. 
 
The reasons for introducing charges for users of road infrastructure is, in general terms, to raise 
revenue and/or to reduce demand  (with the aim of reducing congestion and other externalities).  The 
justification for introducing differentiated charges is that, with a more finely adjusted charge structure, it 
may become possible to reflect the fact that  
 contributions to congestion and other externalities differ according to the type of vehicle, the type 
of road and the ambient traffic conditions; 
 different types of driver have different willingness to pay charges (in part because they have 
different opportunities to make alternative arrangements); and  
 different types of traffic make different contributions to the economy and have different degrees of 
political importance. 
 
Recognising these differences, it would seem that a finely differentiated pricing structure would enable 
the road authority to achieve more ambitious objectives – higher revenues, greater reduction in 
congestion and other externalities and greater political acceptability.  However, the introduction of 
differentiated charges is not without cost and may not necessarily achieve its desired objectives. This 
is because: 
 the equipment and background systems required to achieve some types of differentiation may be 
too expensive; 
 some types of differentiation may be regarded as unfair or intrusive and thus politically 
unacceptable; 
 If charges are too highly differentiated, or are based on criteria which makes the prediction of  the 
charge applicable on any particular occasion difficult, users may be unable to predict the charge 
(or unwilling to invest the effort required to do so) and so their behaviour will not fully reflect the 
intended price signal; and 
 particularly given this uncertainty about the users’ response, it may not be possible to design a 
charging regime which meets such ambitious objectives. 
 
1.2 SCOPE 
This deliverable addresses charges on urban and inter-urban roads and draws on material presented 
in more detail in other deliverables.  The recommendations contained herein are thus based on: 
 the theoretical justification for differentiated road pricing; 
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 evidence from world-wide experience with differentiated tolls  (including evidence on practical 
issues, driver responses and system performance); and   
 results from transport model tests of the impacts of differentiated (including a review of modelling 
conducted in other studies and new modelling conducted within the DIFFERENT project).  
 
The first of these three draws heavily on material presented in Deliverables D2.1 and D3.1 of the 
DIFFERENT project, while the latter two draw on deliverables D9.1 and D8.3/9.2. 
 
The recommendations on the appropriate degree of differentiation for infrastructure charges, which 
this deliverable provides, focus on the road passenger sector.  The interaction between charge 
structures for road passenger vehicles and that for road freight vehicles is not considered in this 
deliverable, but is addressed in Deliverable 8.3/9.2. 
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2 THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENTIATION  
2.1 DYNAMIC DIFFERENTIATION IN TIME AND SPACE 
2.1.1 Efficiency: Social Marginal Cost Pricing 
The concept of economic efficiency is derived from the theory of welfare economics, and is concerned 
with the allocation of resources in an economy.  Welfare economics takes a rather wide view of 
pricing, looking upon price as a method of resource allocation which maximises social welfare rather 
than simply the welfare of the supplier (Button, 1993).  According to this view, prices should equate 
with marginal social cost to obtain maximal social welfare.  What marginal cost pricing does, in effect, 
is to result in transport services being provided up to the point where the benefit for the marginal unit is 
equated with the costs of providing that unit (Button, 1993).  
 
The private provision of the good or service may result in maximising the social welfare.  Where this is 
not the case, regulatory policies may be applied to private companies so that their pricing policy is 
modified to maximise social rather than private welfare. 
 
Deriving socially optimal prices needs an objective function (describing the target to be optimised, in 
this case social welfare).  The most general form of this function is a social welfare function. Formally, 
a social welfare function has as its arguments the indirect utility functions of individuals (Varian, 1999). 
These indirect utility functions indicate the maximum utility levels of the individuals at given prices, 
incomes, and magnitudes of externalities such as congestion and pollution.  The social welfare 
function inevitably incorporates welfare judgements with respect to the distribution of economic 
resources.  These value judgements will be reflected in the policy prescriptions based on the welfare 
function. 
 
An allocation is to be said first-best, if it maximises social welfare subject to the irreducible 
technological constraints of production (Dreze and Stern, 1987).  A first-best optimum in transport is 
an allocation defined by quantities of goods, including passenger and freight transport volumes that 
maximises welfare given the prevailing technology such as vehicle fuel consumption and emissions, 
and the capital stock including transport infrastructure (MC-ICAM, 2002).  This definition encompasses 
externalities if their costs are internalised in the decisions of agents who generate them and included 
in their utility functions.  Economic efficiency then implies that the full costs of transport services are 
accounted for, including social and environmental costs (no externalities). 
 
It should be mentioned that this optimal pricing rule only prevails as a market equilibrium under certain 
conditions, which include: 
 perfect competition; 
 no distortions in other market segments; 
 no externalities; 
 perfect information; 
 no subsidies or indivisibilities of demand or supply. 
 
Clearly, these assumptions will never be met in reality.  This makes first-best pricing very much a 
theoretical result, which is often used as a benchmark for other, more realistic, pricing approaches. 
 
2.1.2 Marginal Cost Pricing and Behavioural Dimensions 
Optimal pricing of infrastructure requires that the user charge equals the marginal social costs.  
Marginal costs are those variable costs that reflect the cost of an additional vehicle or transport unit 
using the infrastructure.  This implies that both user costs (e.g. fuel and time costs) and external costs 
determine the level of the charge.  The distinction between private costs and external costs is not new.  
Pigou showed already in 1920, in his economic analysis of road pricing and congestion costs, that 
individual users entering the road will only consider the costs they personally bear (marginal private 
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costs), but not the external (congestion) costs (marginal social cost) they impose on other road users 
(Pigou, 1920).  This leads to over-demand and a non-optimal situation.  He showed that a levy (a 
Pigouvian tax) equal to the marginal external congestion costs should be imposed from a social point 
of view. In this case only congestion costs have been included in the analysis, but the analysis holds 
for all types of external costs. 
 
There has been a lot of discussion about marginal costs and their central role for pricing in the 
transport sector in the previous decades (see Rothengatter 2003).  One of the most pressing issues is 
the practical application of the concept of marginal costs in the real world.  A critical prerequisite for 
marginal cost pricing in practice is a sound estimate of relevant marginal costs (MC-ICAM, 2001).  
This is not evident for many external costs.  It requires fundamental knowledge on the mechanisms 
behind the generation of these costs.  This understanding, in turn, demands identification of the 
different types of activities in which the users of transport infrastructure are involved.  These activities 
may be called behavioural dimensions.  Various dimensions can be distinguished, depending on the 
marginal costs caused by the individuals, including a large variety of external effects (congestion, 
emissions, noise annoyance, accidents).   For private car road use, this means that optimal individual 
charges should at least vary according to the following dimensions (Verhoef, 2000): 
 the vehicle (technology) used; 
 the actual state of this vehicle; 
 the number of kilometres driven; 
 the time of driving; 
 the place of driving; 
 the actual route chosen; 
 the driving style. 
 
It is needless to say that such a system requires very sophisticated technologies that can monitor 
information about the actual state with respect to these dimensions, and calculate a charge 
accordingly (an issue which will be discussed in the next section). This involves a wide range of 
various critical decisions, both short run (e.g. departure time) and more long run (i.e. car ownership) in 
nature, which determines charge levels.  The great number of behavioural dimensions and categories 
of external costs to be accounted for makes the task of marginal social cost pricing in providing 
optimal incentives to transport users to change their behaviour extremely complex (MC-ICAM, 2001).  
Different dimensions may also simultaneously affect several cost categories, making it even more 
complicated.  Table 2-1 (adopted from AFFORD, 2001) illustrates this and considers road transport as 
an example (a similar illustration could be given for freight transport and public transport).  Car drivers 
can respond in various ways to hypothetical first-best pricing.  When people do not change to other 
modes, they may choose to drive less kilometres, change departure time, choose another route, or 
adjust driving style. More long-term behavioural decisions include car ownership and spatial 
behaviour, which refers to the choice of residence and the location of other activities. 
 
Table 2-1 indicates the relevance of each dependence on a three point scale.  The assigned stars are 
merely indicative and debatable.  That is also the reason for using a three-point scale only.  However, 
the table is illustrative in drawing explicit attention to the dependence between various externalities 
and behavioural dimensions (Verhoef, 2002).  For instance, the way people drive affects congestion 
levels and accidents (risk levels increase with speed).  But it has also a strong impact on noise levels 
and the level of air pollution. 
 
2.2 DIFFERENTIATION BY TIME OF DAY  
The main rationale for differentiation by time of day is the congestion externality as indicated in Table 
2-1.  Often is made a distinction between bottleneck congestion and flow congestion.  The main 
difference is that bottleneck congestion is caused by the existence of physical bottlenecks in the 
network, such as bridges or tunnels.  Flow congestion refers to (limited) road capacity in general.  In 
real networks, observed congestion is often a mixture of both types of congestion. As shown in Table 
2-1, bottleneck congestion is independent of the total vehicle kilometres driven in the network.  It 
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depends only on the question of whether a driver wants to pass the bottleneck.  In the economic 
literature bottleneck congestion has received more attention historically compared to flow congestion. 
 
Table 2-1  Dependence of Various External Costs of Road Transport on Behavioural 
Dimensions 
Car use Car ownership  
Vehicle 
km 
 
Number 
of trips 
 
Time of 
driving 
(peak/off 
peak) 
 
Place of 
driving 
 
Driving 
style 
 
Fleet 
size 
 
Vehicle 
technology 
 
Spatial 
behaviour  
(location of 
work and 
residence) 
Intra-sectoral externalities: 
Flow 
congestion * - ** ** ** * - ** 
Bottleneck 
congestion - ** ** ** - * - ** 
Infrastructure 
damage ** - - - - * * ** 
Accidents * - * * ** * * * 
Inter-sectoral externalities: 
Noise * - * ** ** * ** ** 
Local 
emissions ** * * ** ** * ** ** 
Global 
emissions ** * - - ** * ** ** 
**   particularly strong and direct relation;  
*     possibly strong indirect relation, or moderately strong direct relation;  
-     no particular strong or direct relation  
 
A common framework used to analyse a time differentiated congestion tax is the bottleneck model 
(Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey 1990).  In the model, traffic can flow through the bottleneck at a fixed 
rate of s vehicles per hour. If the arrival rate at the bottleneck exceeds the bottleneck capacity, a 
queue arises.  The model assumes that travellers have a desired arrival time and, in order to arrive in 
time, they choose their departure time.  However, only s vehicles per hour can arrive at the destination 
which is behind the bottleneck so, if too many travellers leave at the same time in order to arrive at 
their preferred arrival time, some will arrive too late at their destination.  On the other hand, some 
travellers may anticipate the queue by leaving earlier but then they arrive too early at their destination - 
and still others do not like queues at all and will choose not to travel (or to use a different transport 
mode that is not affected by the bottleneck).  The model predicts an equilibrium where no traveller can 
change the cost of a trip by leaving earlier or later.  
 
The optimal toll in the bottleneck model at any specific point time is equal to the time cost 
corresponding to queuing in the untaxed base scenario.  As such, no cost is involved for the traveller 
because queuing costs are substituted for taxes and, since no net cost is involved for the traveller, 
total demand remains stable.   For society the toll revenues, which are equal to the waiting costs in the 
untaxed scenario, are a net benefit.  
 
2.3 DIFFERENTIATION BY ROAD CHARACTERISTICS OR TYPE OF ROAD 
As indicated by Table 2-1 a road type based price differentiation ought to reflect both environmental 
and congestion externalities. 
 
The emissions externality of different road types has been studied with the TREMOVE model (De 
Ceuster et al. 2005).  The model uses the COPERT III emissions factors (Arcoumanis 2000) to 
simulate emissions levels for three road types: urban roads, rural roads and motorways.  By applying 
external cost coefficients for the different pollutants a monetary value of the environmental impact is 
assessed. 
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As the environmental impact of emissions is correlated to population density, the emissions externality 
is much larger in urban areas compared to rural areas.  Outside the city, the cost coefficients are equal 
for rural roads and motorways, so here only the level of emissions per vehicle km influences the 
externality level.  The higher average speed on motorways results in somewhat larger external 
emissions costs compared to the other roads. 
 
As it has been outlined in the previous section, the congestion externality is of a much larger order of 
magnitude compared to the impact of emissions.  But in contrast to the differentiation over time, the 
spatial dimension of congestion is a much less understood phenomenon.  The highly time dynamic 
nature of congestion makes it a difficult subject for an analytical approach to networks that carry a 
degree of complexity that is anything beyond two or three links.  A (numerical) implementation of the 
bottleneck model in a network topology can be found in de Palma and Lindsey (2006).   Peak hour 
congestion in the greater Paris area (Île-de-France) is modelled using the METROPOLIS model.   
Apart from trip demand and trip rescheduling this model also allows for rerouting. 
 
2.4 DIFFERENTIATION BY TYPE OF VEHICLE  
User cost differentiation following an environmentally motivated scheme has been studied by 
Knockaert (2006a,b).  The impact assessment is based on simulations using a customised version of 
the TREMOVE modelling framework covering the entire Belgian transport activity demand (excluding 
airplanes and merchant fleet). 
 
The exercise discussed in Knockaert (2006a) focuses on an environmental tax that is imposed on all 
transport activity (all modes/vehicles).  The tax is levied as a per kilometre charge and its level is equal 
to the external environmental damage from emissions (including electricity production for electrical 
vehicles).  The charge is differentiated for different area's (urban, non-urban motorway and non-urban 
other road), time periods (peak/off-peak), and vehicle technologies (fuels, emission standards, engine 
technologies, emission standards e.g. EURO IV).  A broad range of alternative vehicle technologies is 
introduced in the vehicle choice model for private cars (e.g. CNG, battery cars, hydrogen fuel cell). 
 
Some details of simulated damage by emissions are presented in Figure 2-1, which shows average 
damage levels caused by different modes in urban areas in 2020.  The difference between small and 
medium/big cars is explained by the different share of diesel technology in the two classes (small cars 
are nearly exclusively gasoline).  For freight vehicles the data shows that light goods vehicles (LGV) 
are more polluting than heavy goods vehicles (HGV).  This is explained by low load factors for LGV 
vehicles combined with the rather loose emission standards that apply to LGVs. 
 
Figure 2-1  Damage from Transport Emissions in Urban Areas in 2020 (Source: baseline, no-toll,  
scenario as used in the TREMOVE model) 
 
Figure 2-2 details differences in emission damage from new private cars in 2020. The figures reflect a 
representative mix of urban and non-urban activity in Belgium.  Diesel cars are by far the most 
polluting.  All other technologies are below the 1 cent per kilometre level.  The cost of damage by 
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carbon monoxide (CO) emissions is very small compared to other pollutants for all technologies.  It 
should also be noted that potential welfare gains are limited compared to what can be realised by 
optimising for congestion.  This can be easily observed by comparing the external cost components; 
the emissions damage for recent passenger cars are around € 0.01 per vkm (which, assuming an 
average trip length of 10 km, might be of € 0.10 per trip) while the cost of congestion is up to € 3.00 
per trip. 
 
 
Figure 2-2  Damage from Emissions by New Private Cars 2020 Source: baseline, no-toll, scenario 
as used in the TREMOVE model) 
 
2.5   DIFFERENTIATION  BY USER CHARACTERISTICS 
The previous section has shown that equality of prices and marginal costs leads to an efficient use of 
resources in an otherwise ideal world.  But the real world is not ideal. Actual (market) prices may 
deviate from marginal costs for a number of reasons.  While there are many motivations to depart from 
marginal cost pricing, this section focuses on the ones that result in differentiation over (groups of) 
users. 
 
2.5.1 Ramsey Pricing 
A first motivation for user type differentiation is to generate (tax) revenue.  Budgetary problems are 
especially common in transportation, because transport services often exhibit economies of scale so 
that marginal cost pricing does not generate enough revenues to cover costs.  In such a context, 
Ramsey pricing is often suggested to be a solution in order not to deviate too much from efficient 
pricing.  Ramsey pricing minimises the distorting effect of charging more than marginal cost by 
increasing prices more in those markets where demand is least sensitive to price (Nash, 2001).  The 
basic idea is to charge those customers with the least price elastic demand the largest mark-ups 
necessary to cover marginal cost and thereby minimise the reduction in consumption that occurs from 
charging prices that are higher than marginal cost.  Commuters, for instance, will be charged more 
than shoppers, and business travellers more than leisure passengers. It should be noted, however, 
that this form of price discrimination has itself often been regarded as unfair as it exploits market 
power to raise the price for the captive user.  If the view of equity is that all users should contribute to 
the cost of that facility in proportion to their use of it, then some form of average-cost pricing is the only 
admissible pricing policy. 
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2.5.2 Equity 
Transportation often raises equity concerns that seem to conflict with marginal cost pricing.  Marginal 
cost pricing clearly results in very differentiated charges with the consequence that no one transport 
user pays the same price which may be perceived as unfair.  Equity is important in the context of the 
acceptability of pricing.  Many stakeholders raise objections about pricing measures that they perceive 
to be unfair. If a pricing measure is unfair either to themselves in relation to other people or to people 
perceived to be less well off in society, then there could be significant acceptability problems.  
Transport pricing is often perceived as a form of regressive taxation, allowing only those with enough 
money to access a resource (e.g. infrastructure) that was once considered free.  Implementation 
strategies are therefore discussed that allow certain sections of the community to be exempted from 
pricing, or compensate some groups with a lump-sum transfer.  The problem of who should receive 
extra benefits (e.g. tax exemption) and the wider problem of making sure price measures are both 
equitable and perceived to be so, are important issues to be included in any successful 
implementation strategy.  Here the concept of price discrimination shows up.  In public transport, for 
instance, it is common that different prices are charged for the same service.  The fare policy of 
governments may benefit particular groups of society, e.g. the elderly. 
 
The public finance and tax literature makes a distinction between horizontal equity and vertical equity.  
Horizontal equity refers to the principle which states that those who are in identical or similar 
circumstances should pay identical or similar amounts in taxes (Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000).  It requires 
that those with equal status - whether measured by ability to pay or some other appropriate scale - 
should be treated the same.  If, for instance, income were the only measure of a person, then two 
persons with equal incomes would be treated as equals.  Vertical equity states that people who are 
better off should pay more taxes (Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000).  This generally requires that those with 
less ability to pay are treated favourably relative to those with greater ability. 
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3 PRACTICAL ISSUES CONSTRAINING DIFFERENTIATION  
3.1 DIFFERENTIATION BY TIME OF DAY  
Differentiation of charges by time of day, on a fixed schedule, presents no major practical problems. It 
simply requires road users to be aware of the schedule (and of the current time) and that the 
technology used to identify vehicles (or permits) at the charge point “knows” at what time the 
identification occurred.  Differentiation by time of day (and variation of this by day of week or season) 
is thus possible with any electronic or computerised system in which charges are debited from a card 
or account.  Using such technology, a number of systems, worldwide, employ schedules in which the 
charges change as often as once every 15 minutes.  Systems based on pre-payment of a fixed fee, or 
involving manual handling of cash, are obviously less able to cope with detailed variations in charge 
level but can easily cope with a simple differentiation such that between peak and off-peak periods (or 
between charge and no-charge periods).  
 
The main practical limitation on the complexity of the time schedules is simply the ability of road users 
to remember what will be in force at what moment in time.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
difficulties can arise, and resentment can occur, if the definition of the charge periods changes 
frequently or differs between different systems or operators. 
 
3.2 DIFFERENTIATION BY ROAD CHARACTERISTICS  
Differentiation by road characteristics (e.g. capacity, nature of roadside development, gradient, speed 
limit, accident risk, etc) could be accommodated if these characteristics were recorded for each link in 
a geographical database and if the precise location of each vehicle were known by means of satellite-
based positioning of the type already used to support HGV charging in Germany and Switzerland1.  
 
However, the cost of implementing such a system would be high because, in principle, all vehicles 
would need to be equipped with GNSS receivers and systems would have to be devised to detect 
those vehicles which were not properly equipped2. In time, of course, it may become reasonable to 
assume that the majority of vehicles will be equipped with GNSS (e.g. to support in-vehicle navigation 
systems) but this will not be the case in the immediate future. It should be noted that, although a 
degree of locational precision could be achieved at much lower cost by utilising positional information 
from mobile telephones, the precision would be insufficient to support link-specific charges. 
 
Even if/when the problem of cost can be overcome, another potential problem with a system of this 
sort would be that it would be unreasonable to expect drivers to know the cost of each individual link in 
the network prior to committing themselves to using it.  They could not therefore be expected to 
respond, unaided, to the full subtlety of the intended pricing signal.  In practise, if such a system were 
in place, one might expect some drivers to employ navigation systems to help them select an 
appropriate route (the system could be instructed to minimise time or charges or make a specified 
trade-off between the two).  Such a development would result in a proportion of drivers responding to 
the pricing signal and this proportion might be sufficient to achieve the authorities’ desired goal (e.g. a 
20% reduction in traffic using a particular bottleneck) but would raise equity issues in respect of those 
drivers who did not have access to such sophisticated technology. 
                                                    
1 Although the location precision achievable by the current generation of GNSS system is sufficient for most 
networks, it might not be sufficient to support detailed differentiation in networks where satellite reception is 
poor (e.g. in urban canyons in high latitudes).  The arrival of the European Galileo system in 2012 offers some 
improvement in precision over that currently achievable with GPS but some problems will remain.  Even if map-
matching were used to resolve most of the remaining ambiguities, it would still not be possible to guarantee that 
a vehicle was being charged the amount appropriate to the link it was using rather than that associated with 
another link nearby.  However, the lack of certainty need not matter if the charging algorithm were set such that, 
in cases of ambiguity, the lower charge would always be applied. 
2 In practice it might be best to introduce a system whereby vehicles were charged at the maximum rate (even 
when not in use) unless their location on a cheaper route could be established – such a system would put the 
onus on the vehicle owner to ensure that his vehicle was equipped with accurate an GNSS receiver.  Such a 
system might, however, be open to legal challenge in some countries. 
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3.3 DIFFERENTIATION BY TYPE OF ROAD 
Differentiation simply by type of road (e.g. motorway/other, motorway/classA/classB/other, or 
dual/single) could be seen as a less ambitious version of differentiation by road characteristics.  
Although distinction by type of road would be a much blunter instrument, it could provide a means of 
making a broad distinction between different types of traffic (e.g. local/regional), between traffic using 
routes maintained by different authorities, and (all be it only very crudely) between traffic contributing 
to externalities at different marginal rates.  
 
Differentiation by type of road could be supported by GNSS technology but, depending on the different 
type(s) of road being distinguished, a cheaper technology might suffice.  For example, if the distinction 
was simply between motorways (with charges) and other roads (with no charges), the system could be 
supported by a combination of in-vehicle smartcards or transponders, and roadside readers or 
beacons, or even by old fashioned toll plazas.   
 
One concern which may emerge in a network where ownership is split between different governments, 
or controlled by different authorities, is that unless a co-operative solution can be found, the different 
priorities of the different governments may result in a very sub-optimal mix of charges on the different 
types of road.  For example, a national/regional government may impose charges on motorways which 
effectively discourage local users and this may result in diversion onto the local network, or 
conversely, a metropolitan authority may introduce congestion charges on local roads which result in 
local traffic diverting onto nearby motorways and thereby interfering with long-distant traffic.  
Generally, where governments are trying to maximise social surplus for their own populations, they will 
devise charging structures which are globally sub-optimal (e.g. in an asymmetric setting where 
constituents of network owner A do not use network B to the extent that constituents of network owner 
B use network A, The prices will be set higher on network A than on network B – but this may not be a 
welfare-maximising result). 
    
3.4 DIFFERENTIATION BY TYPE OF VEHICLE 
Differentiation by vehicle type may be justified on environmental grounds (e.g. to reflect different 
emission rates) and perhaps also on the grounds that different vehicles have different consequences 
for safety or fulfil different social or economic roles (e.g. if it is argued that emergency vehicles and 
other public service vehicles should not be discouraged or that freight vehicles are more important to 
the economy than private cars).  Differentiation by vehicle type may also reflect political expediency – 
such as a desire not to offend powerful lobby groups such as taxi drivers. 
 
Differentiation by vehicle type is not likely to be politically contentious provided that the criteria can be 
defended (e.g. emissions-based differentials based on European standard emissions categories), and 
that no group seems to be unfairly targeted (generally speaking it is easy to grant discounts or 
exemptions in response to special pleading and the situation becomes untenable only if and when 
those who receive no such special treatment begin to feel unfairly disadvantaged).  
 
The implementation of differentiation by type of vehicle, whether in the form of different charge rates or 
outright exemptions for the favoured classes of vehicle, presents no particular practical challenge 
except to ensure that high-rated vehicles are not being passed off as belonging to a lower-rated, or 
exempt, class.  Provided that the vehicle categorisation is clear, unambiguous and that a database 
exists which allocates the appropriate category to each vehicle registration number, the procedures 
and technology required to achieve this need be scarcely more sophisticated than those required to 
detect a straightforward failure to pay. 
 
Differentiation by type of vehicle may make the charge structure appear more complex, and this may 
make it more difficult to describe and explain the charging structure as concisely as might otherwise 
be possible.  In the short term, the driver of a given vehicle needs only to know the charges which 
apply to that vehicle but, if part of the purpose of the differentiation is that they should think about 
exchanging their vehicle for one in a cheaper category, it is important that the structures are not so 
complicated as to make it difficult to calculate the cost that they would incur if they were driving a 
different class of vehicle.  
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3.5 DIFFERENTIATION BY USER CHARACTERISTICS  
Differentiation by user characteristics (e.g. by journey purpose or income) would be inconsistent with a 
strict interpretation of the economic purpose of road charging (which holds that any difference in 
willingness, or ability, to pay will reflect the true value of the journey and should not be distorted by 
applying differential pricing).  However, such differentiation might be politically desirable and even 
essential.  Thus, for example, it is quite common to provide discounts or exemptions for disadvantaged 
groups such as disabled motorists or to politically important groups such as residents.  
 
As with differentiation by type of vehicle, differentiation by type of user need not present any particular 
challenges provided that eligibility is clear and unambiguous and that procedures are in place to detect 
cheating. 
 
3.6 DYNAMIC DIFFERENTIATION IN TIME AND SPACE 
The externalities produced by the marginal vehicle differ from place to place (reflecting the existence 
of different amounts of spare capacity and different riparian land uses) and over time (reflecting 
variations in traffic and meteorological conditions).  First best pricing therefore requires that vehicles 
should be charged different amounts for using different stretches of road at different points in time. 
Furthermore, since the variation in traffic and meteorological conditions cannot be predicted long in 
advance, the theoretically ideal charging regime would vary in response to actual conditions.  
 
Such a regime faces two formidable practical problems.  The first is that it presupposes that the traffic 
conditions on each link can be predicted in advance and the second is that, to be effective, it requires 
drivers to be aware of and understand the pricing signals sufficiently far in advance to modify their 
behaviour accordingly.  In summary, it requires prices to be calculated, broadcast and understood in 
advance of the events to which they are responding.  Some retreat from the ideal of the theoretically 
perfect system is therefore required. 
 
One compromise is to allow that the charges could be based on best estimates of conditions (using 
forecast weather conditions, recently observed traffic conditions, knowledge of scheduled events and 
a reservoir of data on the evolution of local traffic congestion in similar circumstances) rather than 
purporting to predict random events.  Another is to rely on the ability of intelligent drivers to similarly 
anticipate the local conditions.   
 
Another approach, which was at one time advocated for Cambridge (Oldridge, 1991), might be to 
dispense entirely with the idea of basing charges on predicted conditions but instead to base them on 
actual conditions – as manifest in the speeds at which vehicles are being driven. (For example, a 
vehicle might be charged at 10 cents per km when travelling at speeds below 20Kph and at 5 cents 
per km at speeds above 20kph).  Such a differentiation would automatically capture the effect of 
congestion (the main source of variation in marginal externalities) without needing to vary the 
published rate of charge over time or in response to incidents and could be implemented using 
satellite technology.  The onus, under such a system, would be on the driver to predict the likely traffic 
conditions (and thus the charges) they might experience in different parts of the network in the light of 
experience and advice.  Unfortunately, it appears that a charging regime of this kind is likely to tempt 
drivers to drive dangerously in order to keep their speed above the threshold (Bonsall and Palmer, 
1997) and has therefore been rejected on safety/political grounds (DfT, 1998).  
 
The extent to which drivers with good knowledge of the local network, and of the factors which cause it 
to vary from day to day, might be able to anticipate the network conditions (and thus the charges) at a 
given point in time, has never been fully explored.  However, even with recent advances in the 
availability of real-time information on network conditions and its dispersal to drivers via in-vehicle 
traffic information systems, it remains likely that the inability of individual drivers to predict actual 
charges on individual links would severely limit the effectiveness of this kind of charging regime. 
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4 CONCLUSIONS FROM EVIDENCE  
4.1 DIFFERENTIATION BY TIME OF DAY 
4.1.1 Within the London Congestion Charge 
When it was first introduced in February 2003, the London Congestion Charge operated from 07:00 to 
18:30 on weekdays.  In February 2007, at the same time as the charge area was extended westwards, 
the hours of operation were curtailed to finish at 18:00.  Prior to introduction of the charge, the most 
serious congestion was experienced during the AM peak (from 07:00 to 10:00).  Traffic monitoring, 
summarised in Figure 4-1 below, shows a reduction in volumes entering the charge zone since the 
introduction of the charge. Interestingly, however, the greatest decrease occurs after 10:00 – 
suggesting that the peak-time inbound trips are less elastic and that the off-peak trips were more 
influenced by the charge.  The introduction of an all day charge has thus resulted in more pronounced 
peaks.  The graph also clearly shows a definite peak in traffic entering the charging zone immediately 
after the end of charging hours at 18:30.  This peak in inbound traffic, non-existent before charging 
was implemented, was most marked in the first year of charging.  But it is still evident several years 
later.  Clearly the timing of these trips is being delayed so that they fall just after charging has ended 
for the day.  
 
 
Source: TfL’s 5th Annual Impacts Monitoring Report 
Figure 4-1  Traffic Entering the Central London Congestion Charge Zone  (annualised weekday 
figures for traffic entering the congestion charging zone ) 
4.1.2 On French motorways  
On several tolled motorways in France, toll levels are or have been differentiated to spread returning 
holiday traffic more evenly over the day.  To achieve this peak hour tariffs are increased.  This form of 
congestion surcharge has been used in France on the A1 (Paris-Lille) motorway at weekends since 
1992 and was experimented with 12 years ago on the major links between Paris and the South 
(A10/A11, A5/A6) at summer holiday peaks.  
 
The A1 project was established as a pilot in 1992 to target traffic returning time to Paris on Sunday 
evenings.  The scheme has been regarded as successful and still continues.  Under this scheme, 
tariffs are increased by 25% in the peak (“red”) periods and directions (traffic heading for Paris on 
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every Sunday and some holiday Mondays and Tuesdays), while some tariffs were reduced by 25% in 
the in off-peak (“green” periods from 14:30 to 16:30 and from 20:30 to 23:30)3.  The stated purpose 
was to spread the passenger cars returning to Paris from the South from holidays more evenly over 
the day.  The impact of the scheme was mainly on the timing of trips.  Comparisons of traffic counts 
showed that southbound traffic at the mainline toll barrier near Paris declined by approximately 4% 
during the red period and rose approximately 7 % during the green period, relative to a six-year trend 
for comparable Sundays.  The most pronounced shift was from the last hour of the red period to the 
later green period.   A survey in November 1992 confirmed that many people – about one-fifth of those 
travelling during the green period – sought to lower their toll by shifting the timing of their trips, 
sometimes by stopping for meals at service areas along the highway (an interesting behaviour which 
says something about these drivers’ value of time).  
 
Tolls on an urban section near Marseille are also differentiated according to day/night hours.  
Assessments of the interurban motorway schemes showed that notable traffic transfers occurred from 
peak periods to off-peak periods, or from congested to less congested links. In the case of A5/A6 it 
appeared that +- 6% differentiation induces a diversion of 5% to 12% of the traffic from peak to off-
peak.   Assessments also concluded that the diversion of traffic on non-motorways (un-tolled) link was 
negligible and that public acceptance was generally high. 
 
Motorway operators are in general in favour of tariff modulation, in order to better manage the 
infrastructure capacity and ASFA (Association des Sociétés Françaises d'Autoroutes et d'ouvrages à 
péage) has identified the usefulness of four kinds of temporal differentiation:   
 By designating peak and off peak days  (requiring national coordination and information provision);  
 By designating  “return weekends” (building on the A1 example already mentioned); 
 By defining specific peak periods for specific urban and peri-urban areas (to prevent the 
overlapping of different peaks for different types of traffic)4; and 
 By defining peak periods during which HGVs would be surcharged (to encourage them to use the 
off peak periods). 
 
However, some of the potential effectiveness of such schemes may be jeopardised by the 
simultaneous introduction, by individual toll companies of special discounts and incentives for regular 
travellers (see section 4.5.2). 
 
4.1.3 In the Stockholm Road Charging Scheme  
The Stockholm charging scheme was introduced as a 6 month trial in January 2006 and made 
permanent, following a referendum, in August 2007.  Under the scheme, charges are levied, with 
limited exceptions, on vehicles crossing a cordon around the city centre between 06:30 and 18:30 on 
weekdays.  Nine different charge periods were specified within this 12 hour period with charges of 
SEK 10 (about € 1.00), 15 or 20 being imposed depending on the time of day (but capped at a 
maximum of SEK 60 on any given day).  
 
Comparison of traffic flow data collected during the trial period (April 2006) with equivalent data 
collected in the previous year (April 2005) indicates that significant reductions in flow into the inner city 
occurred during the 12 hour charge period and that there was some evidence of retiming of trips into 
the 30 minute periods either side of this 12 hour period. Interestingly, however, the data does not 
show any differential shift, within the 12 hour period, from the sub-periods with the highest charges 
(SEK 20 or 15) to those with lower charges (SEK 10) – indeed the proportionate reduction in flow is 
greater during the midday (SEK 10) period than during the (SEK 15 or 20) a.m. peak (the a.m. peak 
reduction is 14%, the 12 hour reduction is 19%).  Close examination of the data also suggests that the 
reduction during the pre-peak shoulders (charged at SEK 15) was greater than that at the height of the 
                                                    
3 The reduction is applied to the Lille/Paris gear direction, at exit 10, 9, 8 and at the of Chamant (Senlis) toll 
barrier and applies only to vehicle classes 1 and 2 (cars, monospace, and 4x4). A slightly higher discount is 
available for very short trips. 
4 It may be that different peaks would be defined for different cities (to reflect different patterns of demand). 
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peaks (charged at SEK 20) and the greatest reduction overall occurred in the very first charging period 
in the morning with a SEK 10 charge.  
 
Some details of the results are difficult to explain, and the possibility of errors in the data cannot be 
ruled out entirely.  However, it appears that differences in the composition of the traffic (in terms of trip 
purpose and, perhaps, income) at different times of day may have resulted in greater than expected 
differences in the average elasticities for the different cohorts of traffic and that this effect may have 
outweighed the price differential.  If this interpretation is correct, the conclusion would be that a much 
greater price differential is required to achieve a shift of traffic from the peaks into the off peak period. 
 
4.1.4 In Singapore’s ERP  
Charges in the Singapore ERP scheme vary by time of day and day of week.  This variation is 
intended to persuade drivers to shift from the busiest periods to the less busy periods (or to use 
alternative methods of travel during the peaks).  The overall objective is to promote efficient use of the 
available capacity by reducing congestion and increasing use of spare capacity. 
 
The extent of differentiation is reviewed on a regular basis in the light of trends in traffic flow and 
congestion observed within the network.  Appropriate differentials are determined using known 
demand elasticities and network performance characteristics but are subject to political approval. 
 
A recent innovation, in response to concerns about problems caused by the occurrence of significant 
price differentials between adjacent periods (the problems that this might cause for motorists already 
on the road and the fear that this might prompt unsafe or obstructive driving practices), is to insert  
“transitional“ prices between adjacent time periods.  
 
It is widely believed that the use of time differentiated pricing within the Singapore ERP scheme has 
been a major factor in its success in achieving reductions in congestion and increased throughput of 
traffic.  
 
4.1.5 In US HOT Lanes  
Most of the growing number of High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes employ time-differentiated pricing as 
a means of encouraging drivers to switch from the busiest periods to those that are less busy.  In most 
cases this is achieved by a pre-published schedule of prices which will apply at specified times on 
specified days but, for example in the case of the San Diego I-15 HOT lane, the actual charges will be 
lower than the published schedule if local traffic conditions justify it.  The published schedules can be 
quite complex (for example, the SR-91 price schedule is different on each day of the week and the 
scheduled price may change up to 16 different times in the course of a single day).  In exceptional 
circumstances the pre-defined levels may be over-ridden and a much higher charge imposed but all 
schemes adhere to the principle that drivers are informed of the prevailing price before they have to 
commit themselves to use the HOT lane (and that, even if the price increases while they are using the 
lane, they will not be charged at a higher rate than that which was in force when they entered the 
lane). 
 
The original HOT lane schemes emerged as a potential solution to the underutilisation of high 
occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes; the idea being that other (non HOV) traffic would be allowed to enter 
the lanes on payment of a toll.  Although the objectives of individual HOT lane applications may vary, 
most aim to reduce congestion while maintaining, or increasing, overall flow.  Some aim to reduce 
journey times, not only for traffic using the tolled lane, but also for traffic continuing to use the un-tolled 
lanes.  Most schemes offer an assurance that prices will be set at levels designed to achieve these 
objectives and that prices will not be higher than is necessary deemed necessary to achieve a given 
level of service.  An important principle underlying the HOT lane concept is that non-HOV drivers 
always have a choice about whether they will pay the toll or use the, probably congested, all-purpose 
lanes. 
 
The price schedules for most HOT lanes are determined in the light of observed variations in demand 
and network performance at different times of day and on different days of the week. This, together 
with assumptions about demand elasticities, capacities and speed-flow relationships, allows ideal 
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charges to be identified for different periods.  Experience gained during the early months of 
implementation allows these initial estimates to be refined to reflect local conditions.  Deviations from 
the published schedules may be triggered by real-time data showing the level of flow or congestion to 
be outside the expected range (e.g. if the flow is much lower than expected, a reduction in price may 
be triggered). 
 
Most HOT lanes employ electronic payment systems (or, during trial periods, monthly passes) to 
collect the tolls.  This avoids delays associated with toll booths but restricts the use of HOT lanes to 
those who have pre-registered to use them.  Access to HOT lanes is restricted by the use of barriers 
and designated entry/exit points.   
 
A considerable amount of evidence is now available on the performance of HOT lanes.  The literature 
includes numerous examples of the achievement of reductions in congestion5, increases in average 
speeds and increases in total flow.  The environmental impacts have generally been less positive 
because the increases in speed and flow have tended to outweigh the reduced fuel consumption and 
emissions attributable to reductions in the amount of stop-start traffic.  Most schemes have yielded 
revenues in excess of costs – although the set-up costs appear hard to justify unless there is a 
significant congestion problem to be solved and some spare capacity available. 
 
Almost all schemes have had to overcome a degree of local opposition but, with the help of publicity 
and outreach effort, most appear to have achieved lasting support from the local population.  Although 
the cost of using a HOT lane can vary considerably and, in some schemes, may change after the 
driver has commenced the journey, the resulting unpredictability has not surfaced as a significant 
concern for individual motorists.  It seems that, provided that motorists are informed, via variable 
message signs, of the charge they might incur before they commit to using the HOT lane, and 
provided that they still have the option of using the free lanes, the potential variation in charges is not 
a major concern.  Interestingly, the unpredictability of daily charges has apparently been more of a 
concern for commercial firms who, initially at any rate, were finding it difficult to predict what level of 
expenses their drivers may present to them at the end of each month.   
 
To summarise, it seems that HOT lanes have, in most cases, managed to improve the utilisation of 
road capacity, yield revenue and provide a superior level of service for those prepared to pay for it.  
The most successful schemes appear also to have reduced overall levels of delay and other 
externalities.  HOT lanes thus offer an example of price differentiation (by time day and level of 
congestion) which can achieve effective yield management and an overall increase in social welfare. 
 
4.2 DIFFERENTIATION BY ROAD CHARACTERISTICS   
There are no extant examples of road charges being based on road characteristics (as distinct from 
type or class of road – for which see section 4.3.1 below).  This reflects the fact, outlined in Section 
3.2, that such differentiation would be relatively expensive to provide.  There are, however, some 
interesting examples where tolls have been used deliberately to produce diversion from one road to 
another and, since each road has unique characteristics, such examples are relevant here.  A 
prominent example is provided by the 1995-1997 experiment in France which sought to shift traffic 
from the A6 to the A5.  The A6 motorway, which links Paris to Lyon and the Alps, has traditionally 
suffered from periodic congestion during winter holiday departures and returns.  Since December 
1994, the A5 motorway has provided an alternative route to the A6- but is 71 kilometres longer than 
the A6 motorway between Paris and Beaune and is more expensive and not well known.  The main 
objectives of the pilot project was to shift up to 20% of the A6 traffic to the A5, to  reduce congestion 
on A6, and make the A5 motorway well known to users.  During winter holidays and the Easter 
weekends fin 1995-1997, differential toll tariffs were implemented for light vehicles in favour of A5 
motorway (the A6 toll was increased and the A5 toll was decreased).  This pricing regime did have an 
impact on route choice; about 7000 vehicles transferred to the A5 per weekend and per direction. 15-
20% of the potentially re-routable traffic was now on the A5. 
                                                    
5 Other US evidence (unrelated to HOT lanes) also indicates that peak/off peak differentiation in tolls can produce 
significant reductions in congestion – for example, in Florida, differentiation of 50% in bridge toll levels has 
apparently produced a 20% diversion of traffic from peak to off-peak periods while, elsewhere, temporal 
differentiation of tolls has apparently produced diversions of 5 to 10% of traffic and congestion reductions of 10 
-20%. 
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Models of road charging schemes often include examples where charges vary from one road to 
another.  Usually this reflects a differentiation by road type (see 4.3.2 below) and only rarely is it based 
on a differentiation by other road characteristics – no doubt because such schemes have seemed 
unlikely to be a practical proposition.  However, since the contribution to externalities made by the 
marginal vehicle will vary from link to link, and the hypothetical first-best baseline against which to 
assess the effectiveness of other charging scenarios must therefore allow link-specific charges, 
several modelling studies have represented link-specific charges where the charges are determined 
so as to reflect the contribution to externalities of the marginal vehicle on each link.  
 
Although results from tests of link-specific charges are usually proffered as providing a first-best 
reference, these models typically (but not without exception) only allow links to differ in terms of their 
capacity and speed-flow characteristics and thus do not allow for the fact that links might vary in their 
susceptibility to externalities other than congestion.  Their results will therefore tend to underplay the 
additional benefits which might theoretically be achieved by allowing charges to vary from link to link. 
Nevertheless, even with this caveat in mind, it is interesting to note that these reference cases usually 
show benefits at least 10% greater than is achieved with simpler schemes (e.g. based on 
differentiating charges according to a cruder categorisation of road types).  
 
Modelling work conducted within the GRACE project (Bonsall et al, 2007) provides a rare example of 
the effect of allowing charges to vary from link to link in line with the (supposed) differences in their 
susceptibility to environmental externalities as well as to differences in their susceptibility to congestion 
(this was achieved simply by designating certain links as environmentally sensitive and assigning them 
higher marginal environmental externality rates).  The resulting marginal social cost charges were, of 
course, higher on these links and this differentiation was sufficient to cause traffic to divert away from 
these links and so reduce overall environmental externalities.   
 
Modelling work within the ORBIT study (one of a series of studies of road charging conducted in the 
UK under the auspices of the Multimodal Studies – DfT 2002) tested the effect of introducing link-
specific tolls and predicted that overall benefits could be increased by allowing some links to have 
negative tolls (it should be stressed that a “negative toll” only exists in the model – it is, in effect, a 
reduction in the whole journey toll provided to drivers who use a particular link).  This result 
emphasises that, to achieve optimality, tolls must reflect the overall patterns of network use and not 
just the sum of the use of individual links (e.g. a negative toll on an interurban stretch of motorway 
combined with positive tolls on motorway access/egress links, would help dissuade traffic which uses 
motorways for short distances while not penalising traffic which uses it for longer distances).  
   
4.3 DIFFERENTIATION BY TYPE OF ROAD   
4.3.1 Real Examples  
There are, of course, numerous examples where charges are imposed only on one type of road 
(usually motorways).  It is generally recognised that this creates diversion to parallel, un-tolled, roads 
although the extent of this diversion is often not calculated and anyway varies from case to case 
depending on the size of the toll and the relative attractiveness of the alternative route.  For this 
reason the results cannot be generalised and it is therefore useful to examine the results of models 
(see 4.3.2). 
 
It is, however worth noting that the public seem to accept the fact that, if there have to be charges at 
all, it is more acceptable to have them on motorways than on other roads.  This is perhaps because 
the motorways are viewed as somehow different; new, offering a high level of service and in some way 
optional (people object more strongly to the introduction of charges on roads which have traditionally 
been free and for which no alternatives exist).  The general response to HOT lane charges suggests 
that the principle of paying for a high level of service is acceptable – particularly if the user has the 
option of using an alternative route at lower, or zero, cost. 
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4.3.2  Modelling Work  
Conclusions from Models of Networks under Multiple Ownership  
Charge differentiation may occur in networks where different links are controlled by different 
authorities as a consequence of the different authorities having different objectives or because they 
are in competition with one another.  Ubbels and Verhoef (2008) have studied a hypothetical case of a 
two-link serial road network in which an urban government controls one link and a regional 
government controls the other, and where regional drivers may use both links but urban drivers use 
the urban link only.  Both governments set the capacity and toll on their link in a two-stage game 
where tolls are set after capacities have been committed to, and try to maximise social surplus for their 
own population.  Using a simulation model to investigate the welfare consequences of the various 
possible game-theoretical set-ups, the authors find that governmental competition may be rather 
harmful to aggregate social surplus, compared to first-best policies.  The main determinant of social 
welfare is not which exact type of game is played between the two governments, but much more 
whether there is co-operation (leading to first-best) or competition between them.  The question who is 
leading in the price stage (if there is a leader) is only of secondary importance.  Sensitivity analysis 
suggests that the relative performance for most game situations improves when demand becomes 
more elastic, and remains insensitive with respect to the unit cost of capacity expansions.  
 
UK Studies 
There has been considerable interest in Motorway tolling in the UK in recent years and this has 
resulted in numerous studies of the effect of putting tolls on motorways.  Early studies such as that by 
Mauchan and Bonsall (1995) were followed by much larger studies under the umbrella of the 
Department for Transport’s Multimodal Studies programme (DfT, 2002) and the National Road 
Charging Feasibility Study (DfT, 2004). 
 
Mauchan and Bonsall’s (1995) study used a fixed-matrix SATURN assignment model to assess the 
effect of different forms of motorway toll on traffic diversion to the non-motorway network.  Two types 
of differentiation were tested (i) a simple per-km charge was compared with a flat rate charge 
irrespective of distance travelled, and (ii) tolls imposed on all motorways were compared with those 
imposed only on “strategic” motorways.  The tests showed (i) that per-km charges (in the range 3 to 12 
cents per km) created much more diversion to non-motorway roads than did flat-rate tolls yielding the 
same overall revenue  (the per distance charges typically caused  increases of up to 25% in the flow 
on major non-motorway roads  - five to ten  times as much as was caused by  the flat charges), and (ii) 
that tolls on “strategic” motorways caused about 25% less diversion to non-motorway roads than was 
caused by charges levied on all motorways - even though the latter produced somewhat lower overall 
revenue.   In both cases the diversion to non-motorway roads was felt both on the major roads and, 
via a knock-on effect, on the minor roads.  Results from this study suggest that differentiation by type 
of traffic (long-distance v. short distance) and by type of motorway (strategic v. general purpose) can 
have a profound effect on the impacts on the surrounding network.  
 
The UK’s Multimodal Studies programme (DfT, 2002), examined a range of interesting charging 
strategies, including several options for motorway charges, and drew important conclusions such as: 
that charges imposed solely on motorways had deleterious impacts on other traffic on non-motorway 
roads; that motorway charges could help “lock-in “ the benefits of capacity increases; and that their 
performance could be enhanced if accompanied by the introduction of tolls on non-motorway roads or 
appropriate traffic control measures. 
  
The UK Department for Transport’s National Road pricing Feasibility Study (DfT, 2004) used the 
National Transport Model to test a range of different road charging strategies.  The results indicated 
that the benefits of charging, principally congestion relief, would be considerably increased if the 
charges were varied according to the amount of local congestion.  Marginal Social Cost (MSC) 
charges differentiated only by type of road (the types being: motorways and dual-carriageway roads; 
trunk and principal single carriageway roads; urban roads of class B and C together with rural roads of 
class B; and rural roads of class C together with all unclassified roads) reduced congestion by 14% on 
interurban roads and by 3% on urban roads (compared, respectively, to reductions of  34% and 48% 
achievable by MSC charges varying by area and time of day as well as by type of road).  The study 
indicates that the social benefits (congestion relief and reductions in externalities) of imposing a 
 Recommendations for Differentiated Charges for Car Drivers 
 
26/05/08 Deliverable 9.3 Page 18 
 
uniform per-kilometre charge on all motorways are minimal but that significant benefits are to be 
gained, in the context of a national charging scheme, from the introduction of motorway charges 
which, in order to reflect the amount of congestion and the contribution to externalities caused by 
different types of vehicles indifferent conditions, are differentiated by location, time of day and vehicle 
type. 
 
New Modelling of Hypothetical Metropolitan Network 
New modelling work, conducted within the DIFFERENT project (see Deliverable 9.1), explored the 
performance of road-type differentiated charges in a metropolitan network which included several 
stretches of motorway as well as a network of “ordinary” roads. As expected, the “best” results (almost 
however best is defined) were achieved by applying charges to each link which reflect the contribution 
to externalities made by the marginal user of that link - irrespective of whether it was a motorway link 
or an urban link.  It was also clear that fixed per-km charges on motorways or on urban roads were 
much less effective than charges which were differentiated to reflect conditions (most notably 
congestion) on individual links (fixed per km charges on urban roads (only) were particularly ineffective 
because they caused traffic to use congested routes). Similarly it was apparent that the overall 
performance of a simple cordon charge could be enhanced by adding a per-km charge for use of 
motorways outside the cordon. The introduction of charges on motorways, but not on urban roads, 
produced little benefit and caused unwanted diversion to urban roads. The introduction of a charge 
designed to protect strategic motorway traffic succeeded in achieving that goal but produced little 
revenue and, because it diverted traffic onto the urban network, its overall impact on delay and other 
externalities was quite modest. 
 
Overall, these tests suggested that, by differentiating charges according to the role that a particular 
link plays in the wider network, the usage of different links (and types of links) can be strongly 
influenced but that, due to the complexity of network structures, such an approach can have unwanted 
side-effects and that overall benefit is maximised by defining charges for each link which reflect the 
contribution to externalities make by the marginal user of that link - irrespective of the type of link it is.    
 
The Brenner and Padana Region Motorway Models 
The Brenner model simulates modal split and route choice by passengers and freight on the Brenner 
corridor between Italy and Austria and has been applied to test several alternative road toll 
differentiation schemes.  The Padana Region model covers a large densely populated region with a 
complex network of motorways and other roads.  The analyses, reported in some detail in Deliverable 
8.3/9.2, were designed to estimate the effects of toll differentiation on travellers (both in terms of total 
travel time and total travel costs on the network), on the revenues of motorway’s operator and on the 
environment (total emissions in the study area).  The results were compared to a reference case 
based on the current tolling scheme – which comprises tolls on motorways only.  The attributes 
considered for the differentiation were road type and vehicle characteristics.  
 
Although the results for the tests of differentiation by vehicle type are discussed in Section 4.4.6, it is 
worth noting here that, where vehicle type differentiation resulted in an increase in costs for a 
particular type of vehicle using the motorway network, vehicles of that type responded by diverting to 
the non-motorway network.   
 
In the Padana Region model, where the motorway network is complex and where local trips form a 
significant share of motorway traffic, reductions of tolls on the motorways caused diversion from 
ordinary roads onto the motorways and consequently, led to a reduction in congestion and 
environmental impacts.  Similarly, when tolls were applied on the ordinary roads, vehicles were 
induced to shift to the motorways and there was an overall benefit due to a general reduction in 
congestion.  These tendencies were also apparent in the Brenner model – but only because the 
Brenner corridor motorway had spare capacity (had the motorway been congested it would have 
offered no attractions to the local traffic – even if charges were introduced on the local roads. 
 
Increased charges on the Padana region motorways caused significant diversion to other roads and 
consequent increases in overall congestion.  However, increased charges on the Brenner motorway 
caused very little diversion (because the long distance HGVs – which make up the majority of the 
motorway traffic – find the local network decidedly inferior).  
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Increased motorway tolls provide increased revenues for the motorway operator in the Brenner 
corridor but not in the Padana region (because, in the latter case, motorway users simply divert to 
other roads if the motorway tolls are increased – the only way to increase the revenues for motorway 
operators in the Padana region is to introduce tolls on the other roads). 
 
These differences between the results found in the Brenner corridor and the Padana region highlight 
the fact that the impact of differentiation by road type will vary tremendously depending on the 
structure of the network, the degree of congestion, and the patterns of demand within the network.  
 
4.4 DIFFERENTIATION BY TYPE OF VEHICLE    
4.4.1 Effect of Differential Pricing for Annual Vehicle Registration  
Many countries regard the annual registration tax as an important source of revenue for road building 
and maintenance (in the UK the tax was formerly known as the “road fund tax”) and, in so far as it is 
only levied on vehicles which are to be used on public roads, this tax can be viewed as a form of 
infrastructure usage charge.  Most countries have multiple levels of tax for different classes of vehicle 
(with higher rates for heavy freight vehicles and lower rates for motorcycles being near universal) and 
have justified these as reflecting the different amounts of damage that different vehicles do to the road 
surface. 
 
More recently this principle has been extended to include different charges for vehicles with different 
emissions standards or running on different fuels.  Prominent examples of this trend can be seen in 
Germany and in the UK where the annual tax payable on a private car now (2008) ranges from £35 
(for a car with 101-120 g/km CO2 - those with emissions of less than 100g/km being free) to £400 (for 
a newly registered car with over 225g/km CO2) and where a substantial discount is offered for cars 
fuelled other than by petrol or diesel.  The initial introduction of these differentials caused some 
objection from owners of the higher rated vehicles but this objection faded with time and the recent 
introduction of higher rates for “gas guzzlers” was met with considerable enthusiasm from the owners 
of less polluting vehicles. 
 
The stated purpose of this differentiation is to encourage motorists to consider purchasing vehicles 
with lower rates of emission or alternative fuel sources.  Unfortunately it is difficult to prove that this 
has actually happened or that any changes in the volume of sales of vehicles in the different emissions 
categories can be attributed to the introduction of this price differential rather than to “green” marketing 
or concerns about the rising price of fuel.  One reason for the lack of clear evidence is perhaps that, at 
least until recently, that the price differential has been fairly modest.  Another is that, since the tax level 
is broadly correlated with the perceived degree of luxury and status offered by the car, people’s 
responses to the tax are inevitably tied up with issues of image and environmental attitudes.  
 
The fact that the imposition higher taxes on the largest and most polluting cars appears to be politically 
popular as well as environmentally justified has led several parking authorities to introduce similar 
price differentiation.  It may also explain the reason for the recent introduction of higher charges for 
high emission vehicles in London (see below). 
 
4.4.2 The Effect of Differential Pricing in Stockholm  
The Stockholm charging scheme provides exemptions for vehicles powered completely or partially on 
electricity or a gas other than LPG or on a fuel blend that predominantly comprises alcohol.  Data from 
the scheme indicates that such vehicles, as a percentage of vehicles entering the charge area, rose 
from 3% in the early months of the scheme (2005) to 10% in January 2008.  If this increase can be 
attributed to the exemption for such vehicles having induced more people to buy new green vehicles in 
the run-up to the permanent introduction of the charge, rather than to an ambient trend, this would be 
a highly significant result.  Unfortunately the relevant data has not yet been analysed. 
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4.4.3 Vehicle-type Differentiation within London’s Congestion Charge and Low 
Emission Zone Schemes  
With the exceptions discussed below, the London Congestion Charge scheme does not differentiate 
by vehicle type. It has been argued that, since the “value” (to the driver) of journeys in the charge area 
varies by vehicle type – with a larger commercial vehicle typically getting more value than a small 
private vehicle – the use of an undifferentiated charge amounts to a subsidy in favour of these higher 
value vehicles.  Interestingly, however, the traffic statistics have not shown an increase in the 
proportion of HGVs and vans the traffic entering the charge area since charges were introduced. 
 
The London Congestion charge does not apply to black taxis, buses, powered two wheelers 
(motorcycles and mopeds), pedal cycles and alternative-fuel or electrically-powered vehicles. 
Interestingly, these vehicle types, as a proportion of total traffic entering the charge area have 
increased since the charges were introduced.  
 
Since the start of charging in February 2003 there has been an “automated fleet scheme” that allows 
fleet operators to pay the charge in a different way to private drivers.  This is not specific to a type of 
vehicle (such as car or HGV) but relates to the way in which the vehicle is operated.  Fleet operators 
who wish to pay the charge via the automated fleet scheme must register and pay a £10 charge for 
each vehicle in their fleet.  Payments are then automatically deducted from the fleet account for each 
vehicle identified by ANPR operating in the charging zone on a charging day.  In this way fleet drivers 
do not need to remember to pay the fee (and therefore will not receive penalty notices if they forget or 
otherwise do not pay).  Prior to the July 2005 variations, the daily charge in the automated fleet 
scheme was £5.50 (compared against £5 at that time for private drivers). In July 2005 the charge for 
private vehicles went up by 60% to £8 while that for vehicles in the automated scheme rose by only 
27% to £7 - thus making membership of  the automated fleet scheme more attractive.  Data on charge 
payments before and after this charge in relative prices shows that the change in prices was followed 
by a 16% decrease in the number of standard payments and a 9% increase in the volume of payments 
for registered vehicles.  This indicates that users have recognised the savings to be made by paying 
via the registered vehicle scheme – perhaps as a result of increased knowledge and the increased 
incentive.  
 
In February 2008, London’s Mayor introduced a low emission zone (LEZ) covering most of the area 
inside the M25 ring - a much wider area than the Congestion Charging Zone -  and operating at all 
times (unlike the Congestion charge which operates only from  7:00am to 6:00pm on weekdays).  The 
charge applies to vehicles which do not meet prescribed emissions standards (the current standard is 
based on Euro III for particulate matter) and has been set at £200 per day for heavy lorries, buses and 
coaches and £100 per day for vans and minibuses. It is clearly intended to deter such vehicles from 
entering the London area.  The LEZ charge currently applies only to buses, coaches and lorries over 
12 tonnes but the plan is to extend it in 2010 to cover heavy vans and minibuses. Discounts and 
exemptions are applied to certain special categories of vehicle.  The LEZ operates in the same way as 
the congestion charge and is similarly enforced by ANPR and monitoring cameras.  Vehicles subject 
to the LEZ charge are also liable to pay the congestion charge.  
 
Plans have been announced6 to introduce “CO2 charges” in October 2008. These would be designed 
to discourage use of vehicles with high CO2 emissions within the Congestion Charging Zone. The 
main features would be the introduction of a £25 daily charge imposed on cars and minibuses which 
produce high levels of CO2  (newer cars producing more than 225g/km of CO2 or older cars with 
engines above 3000cc and minibuses exceeding either of these limits), the removal of the 90% 
discount for residents driving vehicles which exceed these limits, the provision of 100% discounts for 
vehicles producing less than  120g/km CO2 and meeting the Euro4 standard for air pollution 
emissions, and introduction of a time-limited reduced congestion charge of £6 for lorries and heavier 
vans that meet the Euro V standard for air pollution emissions.  
 
                                                    
6  These plans were announced by Mayor Livingstone in 2007.  Mayor Livingstone lost the election in May 2008 
and the new Mayor had indicated that he was opposed to these plans.  
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4.4.4 Vehicle-Type Differentiation within Milan’s Ecopass Scheme  
In January 2008, Milan introduced its Ecopass scheme whereby the vehicles in Euro emissions 
classes 0, 1, or 2 are charged a daily fee to enter the central area of the city between 07:30 and 19:30 
on weekdays.  Substantial discounts are available for residents who purchase an annual pass and 
less substantial discounts are available for people who purchase a period pass (Table 4-1 defines the 
actual charges).  Initial results suggest that the scheme has reduced overall traffic in the central area 
by about 12% (adjusting for seasonality and the ambient trend) with a significant reduction in 
congestion.  The reduction in the number of vehicles in Pollution categories IV and V seems to be 
particularly marked.   
 
Table 4-1  Pollution Classes Used in the Milan Ecopass Scheme 
Pollution 
class 
Vehicle EURO category Ecopass 
(€/day) 
Multiday Ecopass 
(€/50 days, €/100 days)
Residents 
Ecopass 
(€/year) 
I gpl - methane - elettric – hybrid  Free Free  ,  Free Free 
 
II 
Euro 3, 4 or more recent petrol cars and goods 
vehicles  
Euro 4 diesel cars and goods vehicles without 
particulate filter  (filters not required until April 
2008)  
 
Free  
 
Free ,   Free 
 
Free  
III Euro 1, 2 petrol cars and goods vehicles  2 50  ,  110 50 
 
IV 
pre-Euro (Euro 0)* petrol cars and goods vehicles 
Euro 1*, 2 and 3 diesel cars  
Euro 3 diesel goods vehicles  
Euro 4 and 5 diesel buses  
 
5 
 
125  ,  275 
 
125 
 
V 
pre-Euro (Euro 0)* diesel cars  
pre-Euro (Euro 0)*,  
Euro 1* and 2 diesel goods vehicles  
pre-Euro (Euro 0)*, Euro 1*, 2 and 3 diesel buses 
mopeds, scooters and motorbikes*  
 
10 
 
250  ,  550 
 
250 
 
 
4.4.5 Vehicle-Type Differentiation on the M6 Toll Road 
The tolls on the UK’s M6 Toll road were originally set in the light of evidence from models and market 
research.  Data from the first six months of operation showed higher than anticipated usage by 
passenger traffic.  The toll operators concluded that passenger traffic was willing to pay more to use 
the toll road (to avoid a notoriously congested stretch of the parallel M6 Motorway) and so raised the 
car toll by 50%.  This appears to be an example of toll differentiation being adjusted to reflect the 
demand response - presumably with the objective of maximizing income. 
 
4.4.6 Vehicle-Type Differentiation within Models of Road Charging Schemes  
Models of road charging schemes often allow for different charges to be levied on different types of 
vehicle.  However, in most cases the differentiation is only between cars/vans and various classes of 
HGV; only rarely do such models seek to show the effect of different charges being applied to different 
types of car.  One reason for this is that, although most models can reflect the effect that such a 
distinction might have on the drivers’ choice of routes (and some can also reflect the effect on choice 
of mode, time of departure and trip frequency), most models are not set up to include the possibility 
that drivers might actually change their type of vehicle in response to the existence of a differential 
charge7. 
 
                                                    
7 Although a structure of a model of choice of vehicle type is easy to specify, the data required to calibrate it is not 
yet available. 
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The Brenner Corridor and Padana Region modelling work (introduced in section 4.3.2 above) tested a 
number of different scenarios for differential charging by vehicle type (EURO category and occupancy 
for cars, EURO category and deadweight size for freight vehicles).  Tests of the effect of charging 
higher tolls for “dirty” vehicles suggested that heavy vehicles would react more significantly than car 
drivers.  Some interesting consequences of differentiation between different classes of freight vehicle 
are discussed in Deliverable 8.3/9.2 (but not detailed here because our interest is in passenger traffic). 
Further tests indicated that although benefits could be gained by introducing vehicle-type 
differentiation on motorways together with relatively undifferentiated charges on the other roads, 
simply differentiating the motorway charges by vehicle emissions category would have a minimal 
impact on overall emissions in the short term (the most polluting vehicles simply divert from the 
motorways onto other roads – this effect being particularly marked in the Padana region). 
 
The Brenner modelling included a series of tests which allowed for the fact that, in the longer run, 
vehicle owners might respond to the existence of higher charges for the most polluting vehicles by 
exchanging “dirty” vehicles for cleaner ones (this mechanism was represented exogenously by 
modifying the demand matrix to reflect a “cleaner” vehicle fleet composition).  Unsurprisingly, the 
results of these tests showed that, with the new fleet structure, the effects that the introduction of high 
tolls for dirty vehicles had had on diversion and suppression of trips were much reduced.   
 
The likely consequence of NOT representing choice-of-vehicle-type in a model of the performance of 
road charging schemes is that the effect that differentiated charges might have on traffic levels and on 
congestion will be exaggerated but that the effect on environmental impacts will probably be under-
estimated.   
 
4.5 DIFFERENTIATION BY USER CHARACTERISTICS  
4.5.1 User-Specific Exemptions and Discounts within the London Congestion 
Charge Scheme 
In addition to the vehicle-type exemptions and discounts discussed in Section 4.4.3 above, notably the 
exemption for black taxis, the London Congestion Charge provides discounts for disabled drivers and 
for residents.  Vehicles registered by “blue badge” holders are eligible for a 100% discount.  Residents 
are eligible for a 90% discount for one vehicle when paying in advance for at least five consecutive 
charging days (if they do not pay in advance they are liable to the full £10 next day charge, or a 
penalty of up to £120 if they forget to pay.  
 
It is generally assumed that many of these exemptions were introduced for political reasons – to help 
gain acceptance for the scheme and avoid antagonising powerful lobbies such as taxi drivers. 
Exceptions to this argument would be the exemptions for emergency service vehicles, public transport 
vehicles, pedal cycles  and alternative-powered vehicles (where social or environmental reasons might 
apply) and two-wheeled vehicles where enforcement might not have been feasible).  The discount for 
residents may be defended on equity grounds only in so far as such people would otherwise face large 
bills - but the socio-economic profile of charge –zone residents and the fact that residents benefit 
disproportionately from the reduced congestion call this argument into question.  A stronger equity 
argument might be raised on behalf of lower income residents who live just outside the charge area 
boundary.  Prior to the introduction of the scheme there was some lobbying, eventually unsuccessful, 
on behalf of “essential workers” needing to access the charge area by car (particularly night workers 
for whom public transport was not a feasible alternative and who would not have left the area before 
the charge period started each morning).  The western extension of the charge area effectively 
increases the value of the discount available to residents of the original zone and provides a windfall 
benefit to those residents of the new areas now included who wish to access the original charge area 
(because they can now do this at a discounted rate).  
 
Since the introduction of the congestion charge, composition of traffic entering the charging zone in 
London has been affected by the existence of exemptions from the charge.  Baseline counts were 
undertaken in 2002 before the introduction of the charge and can be compared against counts taken 
twice annually since then (Spring and Autumn) as part of TfL’s extensive monitoring of the traffic 
impacts of the congestion charge.  In 2002 “non-chargeable” vehicles made up 30% of traffic entering 
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the zone whereas, in the year immediately after the introduction of the charge this proportion rose to 
41% (and remained at that level).  
 
4.5.2 Other Examples 
An interesting consequence of the franchise arrangements for French motorways is that the 
franchisees see commercial advantage in offering various discounts and special offers designed to 
increase revenue.  Examples include the Liber-t Week-End and Activ-t subscriptions.  Liber-t Week-
End offers drivers of light vehicles a 50% reduction on the normal tariff for round trips made on the 
A14 motorway (provided that the outbound trip is made between 12h on Friday and 20h on Saturday 
and the return trip is made between 12h on Sunday and 20h on Monday).  Activ-t will, from Spring 
2008, offer reduced price tolls for regular users of the new Duplex tunnel linking the A86 with the 
western part of Paris.  This offer, which provides reductions of up to 35%, will be open to individuals 
and companies and the franchisee, Cofiroute, is also considering special offers for drivers with limited 
mobility, drivers of electric vehicles, students and car-sharers.  
An interesting feature of the Stockholm congestion charge, unlike the London equivalent, is that it 
does not apply to diplomatic vehicles.  This reflects the fact that it is categorised as a tax rather than a 
charge and so cannot be levied on diplomats8.  
 
4.6 DYNAMIC DIFFERENTIATION IN TIME AND SPACE 
Although several theoretical, model-based, studies have used dynamic differentiation of charges in 
time and space as a hypothetical first-best baseline against which to assess the effectiveness of other 
charging scenarios (see section 4.2), there have been no actual examples of such a system being 
implemented in practice.  
 
Perhaps the closest that this kind of regime ever came to serious consideration was in the early 1990s 
when the technical feasibility of such a system was investigated, and its potential performance 
modelled, in the context of its possible implementation in Cambridge.  However, the proposed 
implementation of this idea in Cambridge was abandoned following the departure of a local advocate 
for such a scheme, growing political opposition to any form of road user charging and concerns (noted 
in Section 3.6) about its safety and likely effectiveness.  
 
Although they cannot be described as examples of fully dynamic pricing in time and space, the 
Singapore ERP scheme and the San Diego HOT lane (described, respectively in sections 4.1.5 and 
4.1.6) have relevant characteristics which warrants mention here.  Singapore’s ERP employs charges 
which are set to reflect expected levels of congestion but they do not reflect actual conditions on each 
day and thus cannot be described as fully dynamic.  The San Diego HOT lane (see section 4.1.6) is a 
dynamic system (in that the tolls on the express lane are varied in response to current and 
immediately predicted levels of congestion in the corridor) but, as a single link, it does not include 
spatial variation in charges.  Nevertheless, between them, these two schemes yield two important 
findings of relevance to dynamic pricing in time and space.  Firstly, that drivers, even from contrasting 
cultures, will accept the logic of dynamic pricing and secondly that the tools required to calculate the 
necessary charges are now well established.  
 
 
                                                    
8 Although The London charge is not a tax, several foreign governments dispute this and have refused to pay the 
charge. 
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5 DISCUSSION OF ISSUES ARISING  
5.1 PRACTICAL ISSUES 
5.1.1 Technical Requirements 
Given the availability of GNSS-based location of vehicles and of appropriate databases (vehicle and 
vehicle owner databases and Geographical Information Systems), there are no significant technical 
obstacles to the differentiation of road user charges in the dimensions commonly considered – with 
one exception; dynamic variation in charges according to current traffic conditions is not yet feasible 
across all links in a network because the required data is not readily available for all links, the real time 
calculation of appropriate charges for each link is not yet possible.  
 
Another practical hurdle for real time dynamic variation in charges on all links in a network is the 
difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of informing drivers about the charges to be expected on all the links 
they might want to use.  The fundamental problem is not in the provision of the information but in the 
ability of drivers to process it sufficiently quickly.  The only “solution” which appears at all feasible is to 
feed the information about imminent charges into dynamic route guidance systems which, in the light 
of information from the driver about his/her desired trade-off between cost and time, could compute 
and recommend routes accordingly.  This might be acceptable to drivers who could afford such 
systems but would leave other drivers at a distinct disadvantage – raising concerns about equity.   
 
5.1.2 Political Achievability 
A road charging scheme is unlikely to become reality unless it receives political support from key 
stakeholders. 
 
The public rejection of proposals for road charging in Edinburgh is believed by some to have been, to 
some degree, a result of the fact that the scheme was perceived as being too complicated (with its 
multiple cordons) and there is certainly evidence that the public did not fully understand what was 
being proposed.  
 
Although the relationship between acceptability and perceived effectiveness not straightforward (for 
example, it seems that a person is more likely to approve of a scheme if it looks likely to be successful 
in reducing congestion but requires no change in their own behaviour), it seems that people are 
sceptical about the ability of complex schemes to deliver the intended changes in behaviour.  It also 
seems that a more complex scheme is likely to be an easier target for press attacks. 
 
Although it can be argued that excessive differentiation of charges may make a proposed charging 
scheme more vulnerable to attack and ridicule, it is clear that differentiation may itself be the result of 
political intervention and special pleading by powerful lobby groups (the widespread practice of 
exempting taxis from charges in urban areas is a testimony to this).  Exemptions and discounts are, of 
course, appealing to those to whom they are offered but there comes a point beyond which the 
granting of further discounts or exemptions begins to offend those who are not so favoured and any 
underlying consensus as to the need for charging may be jeopardised. 
  
Experimental work conducted within workpackage 4 indicated that people’s acceptance of the concept 
of road charging is greater if they believe it to be fair and to have become policy by fair and democratic 
means. 
 
The contrasting outcomes in Edinburgh and Stockholm, in terms of their referendum results, suggests 
that people’s initial scepticism about the utility of a charging scheme can be overcome by positive 
experience from an implemented scheme.  This observation is consistent with the fact that, although 
there was initial scepticism about the extent to which the introduction of charges would help solve 
congestion problems in London, in Singapore, and in the US HOT lane corridors, and consequentially 
some local opposition, the extent of this opposition declined when positive impacts became apparent. 
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In many countries motorists have become accustomed to the idea that a toll is likely to be charged for 
use of new, high specification, road capacity (bridges, motorways etc).  Even where this tradition does 
not exist it is clear that a substantial proportion of motorists are very willing to pay a toll to access a 
new high speed facility which offers a substantially better level of service than was previously on offer. 
 
However, it is equally clear that, unless considerable effort is expended to explain the purpose of a 
new charging scheme and the benefits that it will bring, people’s natural tendency is to object to the 
introduction of charges on existing (previously free) roads on the grounds that it is an unfair imposition 
on their accustomed right to use roads without payment at the point of use.  The objection to the 
introduction of new charges on existing infrastructure is particularly marked when the roads are part of 
the “normal” network rather than motorways.  Unfortunately, although it is likely to be easier to gain 
political support for introducing charges on motorways than on other types of road, the benefits from 
so doing are generally lower than can be obtained by introducing charges on urban roads.  
 
There is some evidence to suggest that the general objection to new charges on roads that were 
previously free is reduced if the charge has a clear and obvious purpose.  Thus the introduction of 
charges which, through differentiation, appear to target particular problems (such as excessive or 
inappropriate traffic at peak periods or vehicles which make an excessive contribution to 
environmental problems), may be more acceptable than charges which appear simply to be designed 
to raise revenues. 
 
5.1.3 Contextual Constraints 
Where motorways and other roads come under different political or administrative jurisdictions, it may 
be difficult to achieve a coordinated approach to the introduction of charges or agreement on the 
appropriate structure of those chargers.  This will make it difficult to achieve social or environmental 
objectives.  Competition between government authorities seeking to best serve their own constituents 
may produce a charge regime which performs no better, and perhaps much worse, than that likely to 
result from competition between profit-oriented concessionaires.  Theoretical modelling has indicated 
that, while social welfare may be maximised by having charges set by one government agency 
responsible for the entire network, competition between government agencies attempting to maximise 
the welfare of their separate constituencies is likely to yield less welfare than that might come from a 
monopolistic profit optimiser or from effective competition between profit optimisers.  
 
It is quite common for the administration of motorways in a conurbation to be separated from that of 
other roads in the area.  In such cases it is likely that the owners, managers and/or franchisees of the 
different networks will have different objectives.  Typically, the motorway manager will want to 
maximise revenue (initially to cover the costs of the infrastructure and subsequently to generate profit) 
or maintain strategic connections while the urban roads manager will want to manage congestion 
and/or promote the local economy.  These different objectives would lead them to favour different 
charging regimes and, left to their own devices, they might introduce different, potentially conflicting, 
regimes.   
 
Achievement of social or environmental benefits may depend on appropriate investment of revenues, 
and this may not be possible if the network is split between different authorities or concessionaires. 
 
The degree of interaction between urban roads and adjacent motorways depends on the location and 
frequency of motorway access and egress points, the density of the urban network and the degree of 
spare capacity on parallel links in each network.  Obviously, the greater the degree of interaction the 
more important it is to consider the potential cross-impacts.  Considerable problems are likely to occur 
if charges on urban roads are designed without regard to their potential impact on any adjacent 
motorways or if charges on motorways passing through metropolitan areas are designed without 
regard to their potential impact on the roads in those areas or on the local economy. 
 
 
Where networks interact, the introduction of differentiated charges on motorways, without introduction 
of commensurate charges on other roads, is likely to lead to a decrease in overall network 
performance (thus, improvements in overall network performance are unlikely to be produced by the 
actions of motorway concessionaires; a network-wide approach – perhaps involving whole-network 
concessions – is required).  
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5.2 BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE 
The issue of behavioural response to differentiated charges has been addressed in some of the case 
studies but more detailed insights have emerged from the work described in Deliverables 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
1. The general conclusion from the case studies, notably Singapore, London, Stockholm, and the US 
HOT lanes, is that people have had little difficulty understanding the levels of differentiation which 
have so far been introduced and appear to have responded to price differentials in a fairly rational 
manner.  However, this conclusion requires some qualification: 
2. All the existing schemes or trials have utilised a fairly simple charge structure – the only one which 
might be thought of as in any way challenging is the high levels of temporal differentiation 
employed in the US HOT lane schemes; and 
3. The observed response to charge differentiation has not always been exactly as expected.  For 
example: 
• The initial introduction of the London Congestion Charge caused more behavioural change 
than would be expected on the basis of standard elasticities.  Recent data suggests that, over 
time, the scale of the response is reducing and that the response to the increased charge was 
less than would be expected on the basis of the response to the original charge.  This evidence 
is consistent with the existence of a “perceived transaction cost” which is effectively added to 
the cost of the charge itself and so exaggerates its effect, but which decreases in size as 
people become familiar with the procedures.  It would seem reasonable to expect any such 
“perceived transaction cost” to be greater in the case of a highly differentiated charge than it 
was in the London case. 
• The responses to the three levels of charge in Stockholm (peak, shoulder and inter-peak) 
suggest that sensitivities to the charge are very different at different times of day. It is assumed 
that this reflects the different elasticities associated with different journey purposes but that 
other factors, such as income, may also be playing a role.  This result emphasises the range of 
factors which affect response and the difficulties likely to confront any attempt to predict the 
impact of a differentiated charging regime.  
 
The general conclusions from the work described in Deliverables 4.1 and 4.2, some of it derived from 
past studies and some of it new to DIFFERENT, are: 
 The cognitive load created by differentiated charging structures increases significantly with the 
degree of differentiation – and is particularly high when there is differentiation in more than one 
dimension.  
 Spatial differentiation creates more cognitive load than temporal differentiation. 
 With experience, people become better able to understand differentiated charge structures. 
 People’s behavioural responses to charges are inter-related in a quite complex way with their 
acceptance of the concept; some evidence suggests that lack of acceptance leads to a very 
cursory consideration of the most appropriate behavioural response, other evidence suggests the 
opposite, and other evidence suggests that acceptance leads to a larger behavioural response.  
 The more highly differentiated the charges, the more likely people are to make errors in their 
estimates of the charge payable for a given journey. 
 When a charge structure appears difficult some people respond by putting less effort into trying to 
understand it. 
 A charge structure is more likely to be understood if it has a clear underlying logic which has been 
fully explained and justified. 
 The more difficult it is to understand and predict the charges, the less likely it is that people will 
respond to the price signal in the intended manner.  The following tendencies have been 
observed: 
• If the charge is thought to be trivial people are likely to ignore it and continue with their previous 
behaviour.  If a charge appears complex, this “threshold” for serious consideration will be 
higher (i.e. a complex charge has to be higher before it provokes a behavioural response). 
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• Among charges with are though likely to be low, but not so low as to be regarded as trivial, a 
complex charge will tend to provoke more behavioural response than will a simple charge. 
• Among charges with are though likely to be high, a complex charge will tend to provoke less 
behavioural response than will a simple charge. 
 
5.3 COST  EFFECTIVENESS 
The benefits of differentiation must be set against the costs of achieving it and the evidence from 
modelling work suggests that the majority of the welfare benefit achievable from road charges can be 
gained through a relatively simple system with minimal differentiation.  The majority of the welfare 
benefit comes from reductions in congestion and these can be substantially achieved simply by 
charging only at peak times in urban areas.  More sophisticated charging regimes with graduated 
charges reflecting the amount of congestion at different types of day and on different links will achieve 
greater reductions in congestion but, if they require expensive technology or databases, may not be 
worthwhile.  Differentiation by type of vehicle is, by contrast, relatively cheap to achieve and is thus 
easier to justify. 
 
In any given location it may be possible to define a single charge area and single charging period in 
which, with readily available technology (smartcard or automatic number plate recognition), a 
significant proportion of the theoretically achievable benefit can be achieved by means of an 
undifferentiated charge.  In other locations or circumstances a significant proportion of the potential 
benefit may be achieved by means of charges at key bottlenecks or on strategic links – again using 
quite simple technology.  However, from a wider perspective, the aggregated cost of numerous free-
standing schemes will mount up and it will eventually become more cost effective to select a single 
technology, supported by shared data bases and administrative systems, to serve numerous individual 
schemes.  Once this point is reached, the technology is likely to be capable of locating vehicles in time 
and space and will therefore support a significant degree of charge differentiation at no additional cost. 
 
These arguments have been put in the context of a system designed to achieve public welfare; rather 
different arguments apply where the objective is to maximise revenue, or infrastructure yield, by 
capitalising on the different price-elasticities and behaviours of different categories of road user. In 
such cases, the most important dimensions of differentiation are trip purpose and driver 
characteristics.  Although these may be proxied by the time/day at which the vehicle is observed, they 
are more effectively captured by differentiating according to vehicle type, type of account 
(individual/company) and trip frequency (the latter being identified via willingness to purchase 
discounted tickets for multiple journeys).  These dimensions of differentiation are readily supported by 
smart-card technology and, although they must be based on careful market research, are likely to be 
commercially justified in most circumstances.                                                               
 
 Recommendations for Differentiated Charges for Car Drivers 
 
26/05/08 Deliverable 9.3 Page 28 
 
6 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The following principles will apply irrespective of the underlying reason for introducing differentiated 
road charges:  
 When designing a differentiation scheme, account must be taken of the full range of potential 
effects in both the short term and the long term. (For example, although introduction of higher 
motorway tolls for the most polluting vehicles may, in the long term, result in decreased use of 
such vehicles, the main short term effect may be for such vehicles to divert to un-tolled roads – 
where they may create even more nuisance); 
 Where responsibility for setting charges in a network is split between different authorities or 
concessionaires but there is a potential interaction between the sub networks; 
• it is important to consider the nature of potential interactions between co-introduced 
sets of charges in different parts of the network.  
• cooperation on technical and procedural issues, and over detailed definitional points such 
as common time zones for peak-load pricing, vehicle classifications and exemptions, is 
desirable even if the two road authorities have different objectives (in the absence of such co-
operation the resulting complexity will increase costs for system operators and end users and 
cause particular resentment among the latter). 
 In order to achieve public acceptance of differentiated charges, it is important to explain the 
reason for the differentiation (e.g. to achieve reductions in congestion where and when it is 
most severe, to discourage use of environmentally damaging vehicles, to protect vulnerable 
groups of drivers, etc). 
 Finally, even every effort has been made to help people understand the charge structure (see 
section 6.2), it would be unwise to expect a precise response to complex pricing signals. 
Results show that precise calculation of prices by individual travellers is unlikely and that people 
are likely to base their response on a heuristic assessment   - particularly if the difference between 
the price levels are low because people will not think it worth the effort to calculate the precise 
value. As a generalisation, one should expect under-response to complex prices in high-price 
domains and over-response to prices in low price domains (unless the expected price is so low 
that it is ignored completely).  
 
It should also be recognised that people differ in terms of their ability to respond to complex pricing 
signals and that this may give rise to equity concerns. People’s ability to respond to complex pricing 
signals will depend on their prior experience and their access to computer-based support systems.  
 
6.2 TO  ACHIEVE A BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE TO THE PRICE SIGNAL 
Assuming that the objective of introducing differentiated charges is to influence road users to change 
their behaviour in line with the price signal, the following guiding principles should be born in mind:  
 Do not introduce unnecessary differentiation. The more complex pricing schemes are, the 
more difficulties people will have in dealing with them and the less likely they are to respond to the 
nuances embodied in the charges.  
 Build gradually on existing differentiation. People become familiar with particular types of 
differentiation and so find it easier to deal with differentiations with which they are already familiar. 
Also, during the introduction phase of road pricing, low levels of differentiation (or even 
undifferentiated prices) are recommended to ensure better understanding and habituation to the 
new situation. When road users have become familiar with the initial charges an increased level of 
differentiation can be introduced. 
 Avoid types of differentiation which are particularly difficult for people to comprehend. For 
example, avoid elements which:  
• vary non-linearly (e.g. with price as an increasing function of speed),  
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• vary unpredictably (e.g. with price as a function of current congestion),  
• are not clearly observable (e.g. with price based on current emissions),  
• are based on values which are not readily known (e.g. with prices expressed per km – because 
people do not have good knowledge of journey distances),  
• are based on spatial divisions which may not be widely known (e.g. with cordons or zone 
boundaries which do not follow well-known boundaries), and 
• imply complex cross-linking to other elements (e.g. with different time bands applying in 
different zones - people have difficulties dealing with interacting variables). 
 Provide information and advice about the price structure of the charging schemes.  This is 
to help users see/understand the underlying “pattern” and thus make the details easier to recall 
(especially important in the case of highly differentiated prices).  
 Provide information which stresses the justification for the scheme. (e.g. information on 
benefits, use of revenue, protection for vulnerable groups, scientific justification, political support). 
This is to make the scheme seem more acceptable to users and so increasing their understanding 
and willingness to engage. 
 Provide (and publicise) opportunities to change behaviour according to the differentiated 
charging schemes. Perceived opportunities for users to respond to pricing schemes (rather than 
simply having to pay the charge) are essential to avoid negative reactance and failure to engage.  
 
6.3 TO  MAXIMISE SOCIAL OR ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS 
Although it has not been proven by detailed modelling, it appears unlikely that a scheme designed to 
maintain free-flow on the motorways or maximise revenue for the motorway manager would 
simultaneously minimise congestion and other externalities within the urban area. Thus, at risk of 
stating the obvious, in order to maximise overall benefits, a degree of prioritisation or compromise is 
required between potentially conflicting objectives of different stakeholders. In doing so, the following 
principles should be born in mind: 
 The “best” solution would allow charges to be differentiated according to the 
characteristics of individual links and the amount of traffic wanting to use them at any 
given point in time. This implies a degree of differentiation which, while technically achievable, 
may be more complex than people can cope with. 
 As a second best approach, the different roles and characteristics of different types of road may 
make it wholly appropriate to introduce different charges on different types of road – with 
higher charges on congested urban roads than on parallel motorways. 
 Equally, a considerable proportion of the theoretically achievable benefit can be obtained by 
introducing time-varying tolls.  Considerable benefit can be gained simply with a peak / off-peak 
differentiation but greater benefit is achievable (in the case of limited access links at least) from a 
dynamic variation as applied in some of the US HOT lanes.  
 
Generally, it  seems likely that overall benefits (defined as minimisation of delay, accidents and other 
externalities while maximising the benefits to society and the economy) might be maximised by 
combining a charge on the urban roads with charges designed to give a degree of protection to traffic 
using motorways and other strategic links. The urban charge might be levied on traffic crossing 
specified cordons or using roads within a specified area while the strategic-link-protection charge 
might involve specific charges for using motorway access or egress links or dynamic charges just 
sufficient to preserve free flow conditions.  
 
6.4 TO  MAXIMISE REVENUES 
If the objective is simply to maximise revenues then differentiation takes on a new role. Generally 
speaking, it becomes a mechanism for yield management and for targeting special markets. For 
example: 
 Recommendations for Differentiated Charges for Car Drivers 
 
26/05/08 Deliverable 9.3 Page 30 
 
 By charging higher tolls in exchange for a guaranteed high level of service (as in the US HOT 
lanes).  
 By charging higher tolls to traffic which has little choice but to pay (as may be the case for some 
bridge tolls, but is generally truer for peak period traffic than for off-peak traffic). 
 By offering discounts to users who may be encouraged to increase their usage of the system (as 
in the the Liber-t Week-End and Activ-t  schemes). 
 
It is perhaps also worth noting that, if the objective is to maximise revenues, advantage can be taken 
of the fact that, faced with a seemingly complex charge in a high, or very low, price domain, users tend 
to under-respond to the actual charge (i.e. they have a tendency simply to pay up and continue with 
their previous pattern of behaviour) – thus yielding more revenue than would have been produced if 
the charge had been readily understood. 
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